38 ideas
3123 | Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints [Segal] |
16943 | Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine] |
3125 | Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality [Segal] |
16949 | Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine] |
16939 | Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine] |
16948 | Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine] |
16945 | We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine] |
3105 | Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal] |
3106 | If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal] |
16944 | Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine] |
16941 | Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine] |
16940 | Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine] |
16933 | Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine] |
3113 | The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth [Segal] |
16934 | General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine] |
16938 | To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine] |
16947 | Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine] |
8486 | Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine] |
22100 | Experienced time means no two mental moments are ever alike [Bergson] |
3112 | Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal] |
3108 | If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal] |
3110 | Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal] |
3124 | Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal] |
3109 | If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal] |
3116 | Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal] |
3117 | Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal] |
3104 | Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal] |
3111 | Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal] |
3103 | Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal] |
3121 | If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal] |
3118 | If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal] |
3119 | Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal] |
16932 | Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine] |
7375 | Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett] |
16935 | If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine] |
16936 | Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine] |
16937 | You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine] |
16942 | It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine] |